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Summary
This study aimed to provide an overview of the 
evidence for using remuneration systems for Alcohol 
Brief Interventions (ABIs) in primary care, to examine 
the availability of relevant data in Scotland and to 
explore the views of local and national stakeholders. 
There were three strands to the study: 
•  A rapid literature review on the design and impact of 
remuneration models on the delivery of screening and/
or brief interventions for alcohol in primary care.
•  Document and data analysis on remuneration systems 
from three local health boards and an assessment of the 
availability and utility of ABI data.
•  An interview study with five key local and national 
stakeholders on the design and impact of remuneration 
models.
Rapid Review
The rapid literature review indicated that evidence in 
this area is scarce, particularly in relation to systems 
implemented in routine practice (1,2). 
Whilst impacts on either patient or provider outcomes 
of interest were mixed, incentives may be an effective 
implementation strategy to encourage primary care 
providers to deliver alcohol interventions, particularly 
when targeted at specific patient populations (2), or when 
delivered as part of a multi-component approach (3). 
There is limited data on the optimum level of incentives 
required in order to achieve positive effects, although in 
general, payment schemes that focus on outcomes as 
opposed to process appear desirable (4,5). 
Local Case Studies
Three models of remuneration were examined. Structures 
and rates of payment varied considerably over time and in 
different areas: one provided core funding for community 
nursing; one paid only for brief interventions; and two paid 
separate incentives for screening and brief interventions. 
No firm conclusions could be drawn about optimal models 
or levels of payment or the impact of changes over time.
The ratio of brief interventions to screenings delivered also 
varied widely across practitioners and areas: no outcome 
evidence was available to indicate what ‘conversion’ rate 
was optimal; and no process evidence was identified to 
inform what underpinned the variation in rates. 
Interview Findings
Interviewees disagreed on whether incentives led to 
increased delivery of ABIs; however, other benefits cited 
included that the contracts under which incentives were 
provided enabled training and monitoring of delivery to 
be mandated in ways that could not otherwise have been 
achieved. 
Whilst distortions such as misrepresentation or gaming 
are recognised risks (6) and were acknowledged as 
possibilities by interviewees, there was little sense that 
they were widespread problems, and not viewed as fatal 
flaws in the programme. 
Conclusions
Despite the scale and ambition of Scotland’s ABI 
programme, it has failed to contribute substantially to 
the ABI evidence base, including on important questions 
such as the impact of financial incentives on ABI delivery, 
quality and resulting patient outcomes. As the Scottish 
Government ‘refreshes’ its national alcohol strategy, there 
is an opportunity to address this weakness to inform future 
alcohol policy in Scotland and globally.
1. Introduction
In the mid-2000s, an increasing body of evidence 
showed that alcohol-related deaths, and especially 
liver cirrhosis rates, were increasing steeply in 
Scotland, more so than in other parts of the UK, 
while death rates were decreasing in other European 
countries (7). Between 1979 and 2014 the number of 
alcohol-related deaths approximately doubled (8). In 
2014, the age-standardised mortality rate was 31.2 per 
100,000 population compared to 18.1 in England, 19.9 
in Wales, and 20.3 in Northern Ireland (9). The Scottish 
Government responded with a high-profile national 
alcohol strategy, which emphasized the importance 
of reducing alcohol consumption across the ‘whole 
population’, and introduced the flagship policy of 
minimum unit pricing for alcohol (10,11), which at the 
time of writing remains subject to legal challenge by 
corporate alcohol producers. 
Prior to the national strategy, the Scottish Government 
introduced a target for the National Health Service (NHS) 
in Scotland (known as HEAT Target H4) (12). This target 
required the NHS to deliver a minimum number of Alcohol 
Brief Interventions (ABIs) in three priority settings (primary 
care, A&E, antenatal) from April 2008, and later in a range 
of other ‘wider’ settings such as youth services (13,14). 
ABIs are heterogeneous interventions (15–18) that include 
‘short conversations aiming in a non-confrontational 
way to motivate individuals to think about and/or plan 
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a change in their drinking behaviour in order to reduce 
their consumption and/or their risk of harm’ (13). Several 
systematic reviews have found ABIs to be efficacious, 
primarily in reducing self-reported alcohol consumption 
(19–21). Debate is ongoing about the validity of self-
reported consumption as a predictor of health or other 
outcomes for patients, and the extent to which current 
evidence has translated into the implementation of ABIs in 
routine general practice (22).
ABIs have historically included the use of a screening 
questionnaire to assess an individual’s consumption level 
and risk of alcohol problems, followed by the provision 
of personalised feedback to those who might benefit 
(16). The Scottish Government target built on an earlier 
national clinical guideline (SIGN Guideline 74 or ‘SIGN 74’) 
which recommended the delivery of screening and brief 
interventions in primary care. SIGN 74 did not recommend 
universal screening for alcohol problems, but included an 
extensive list of potential presenting conditions and issues, 
when screening of the patient was recommended (23). 
The national target was divided up into targets for each 
local health service (‘health board’) in Scotland which were 
required to report regularly on implementation progress. 
The national initiative was well-resourced (10), encouraged 
local ownership of implementation (12,24), focused on 
addressing risky drinking rather than alcohol dependence 
(24,25), and emphasised professional education for nurses 
and doctors based on interactive skills teaching (25). ABIs 
were implemented extensively, with delivery of 667,037 
ABIs reported over an eight-year period, exceeding the 
target of 454,854 (26,27). The majority of reported ABIs 
have been delivered in primary care (59% by April 2015) 
(27), and each local health board has developed its own 
local contractual arrangements with general practitioners in 
primary care, who are independent contractors to the NHS. 
These local contractual arrangements for ABI delivery, 
known as ‘Local Enhanced Service’ or ‘LES’ contracts, 
typically included fees for delivery of screening and/or brief 
interventions. There were substantial differences between 
boards across Scotland in the contracts, including in how 
payments were structured and the level of remuneration 
(24). Little is known about the availability, depth or quality 
of delivery data held by local health boards in relation 
to primary care ABIs, nor about the impact of different 
models and rates of payment on the implementation of 
screening and ABIs. Recent decades have witnessed the 
increased application of performance management tools 
and techniques such as financial incentives to stimulate 
improvements in healthcare (28). However evidence 
of the impact of pay-for-performance on the quality of 
health provision remains equivocal (29). As the Scottish 
Government prepares a ‘refresh’ of the national alcohol 
strategy, it is timely to consider the importance and 
optimum use of local contracts and incentives for primary 
care delivery.
Aim and objectives
The aim of this scoping study was to examine the 
availability and utility of data relating to, and explore 
stakeholder views on, remuneration and delivery rates for 
Alcohol Brief Interventions in Scotland, in order to inform 
future implementation, and further study.
The objectives of the study were: 
1  to conduct a rapid literature review on the design 
and impact of remuneration models on the delivery 
of screening and/or brief interventions for alcohol in 
primary care;
2  to identify and where possible source data on 
remuneration systems from three local health boards 
and assess the availability and utility of ABI data; and
3  to explore the views of key local and national 
stakeholders on the design and impact of remuneration 
models.
We report separately on each of these strands in the 
following chapters of this report.
Ethics
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from 
University of Stirling’s ethical committee (SREC 15/16:49). 
Participants gave full informed consent and were given the 
opportunity to review the report for accuracy and to ensure 
they were comfortable with any quotations used prior to 
publication. No changes were made by participants at this 
stage. No patient-level data was analysed.
2. Evidence on level and 
impact of remuneration 
systems for ABI
Aim & methods
The primary aim of this rapid review was to examine the 
published literature relating to the design and impact of 
remuneration models for screening and/or brief intervention 
for alcohol in primary care. 
We searched PubMed for peer-reviewed studies in the public 
domain, published in English, between 1st January 1990 and 
17th May 2016, reporting on the effect of payment systems in 
delivering ASBI in primary care using search terms relating to: 
a) alcohol; b) primary care; c) brief interventions; and d) pay 
for performance/financial incentives. Our full search strategy 
is outlined in Appendix A.
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Overview of studies
We identified 235 titles, of which ten underwent full text 
review. Of these, four studies met our inclusion criteria (1–
3,30) and six studies were excluded (31–35) (see Figure 1 
in Appendix A). The findings from the four eligible studies 
are described narratively below, with data summarized in 
Table 2 in Appendix A. 
All included studies were based in primary care settings 
and covered a range of countries (UK, USA, Australia, 
Catalonia, Poland, Netherlands and Sweden). Study 
design varied. One eligible paper reported on a cluster 
randomized controlled trial to test different strategies aimed 
at increasing rates of screening and brief intervention 
delivery in routine practice (3). Another paper summarized 
the findings of a retrospective longitudinal study drawing 
on routine primary care data to evaluate the impact of a 
targeted incentive scheme (the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF+)) on alcohol screening rates amongst a 
specific patient population (2). One study drew on a range 
of existing routine cost and prevalence data sources to 
model the cost-effectiveness of four different strategies 
to increase delivery of screening and brief interventions 
in Australia (30). The final included paper used mixed 
methods (interviews and documentary analysis) to assess 
the level of state Medicaid payments in place to support 
the delivery of screening and brief alcohol interventions in 
the USA (1).
Findings
This rapid review found limited evidence on either the rate 
or impact of reimbursement schemes for the delivery of 
screening and brief interventions for alcohol. Only four 
studies were identified, of which just two reported on 
payment schemes which had been implemented in routine 
practice as opposed to within a research context (1,2). 
Incentives paid to providers for screening patients for risky 
drinking ranged from approximately £5.11 (€6) to £7.67 
(€9). Only one study reported specific intervention delivery 
payments, which ranged from approximately £11.56 
(€13.50) to £21.40 (€25) (3). 
Overall, there was some evidence of effectiveness for 
the use of financial incentives to encourage primary 
care providers to screen patients for risky drinking, 
and to deliver brief interventions to those in need of 
further support. Two studies reported a significant rise in 
screening rates as a result of the introduction of respective 
payment schemes (2,3). However, there was limited data 
to assess their impact on the delivery of subsequent 
advice/interventions for alcohol, or on the effectiveness 
of such schemes on other important outcomes of interest 
such as patient alcohol consumption. Shanahan et al 
provide a hypothetical assessment of the potential of 
financial incentives to reduce overall consumption amongst 
patients when introduced within the Australian primary care 
context (30). However their study suggested that payments 
were substantially less effective than alternative strategies 
such as the introduction of a computerised reminder 
system and academic detailing. Also described as 
‘educational outreach’, academic detailing involves a range 
of techniques aimed at improving intervention delivery or 
prescribing practice, most commonly via the use of trained 
“detailers” (usually clinicians) conducting face-to-face 
visits with physicians to encourage adoption of a desired 
behaviour pattern (36). Shanahan et al acknowledged 
that the fact they assessed the impact of single rather 
than combined implementation strategies represents a 
key limitation of their modelling study (previous evidence 
suggests multifaceted strategies are more likely to be 
effective (37)). 
Importantly, Anderson et al provide the only example of 
a study which sought to test the impact of a combination 
of strategies on reported screening and brief alcohol 
intervention delivery rates (as well as being the only 
experimental design study we identified). Whilst training/
support and financial reimbursement were both effective 
when introduced in isolation, the greatest impacts were 
realized via the implementation of multi-component 
strategies, specifically a combination of both training/
support and financial reimbursement (3). 
Conclusion
Whilst the literature is limited, the available evidence 
suggests that financial incentives may be an effective 
strategy to encourage primary care providers to screen 
patients and/or deliver alcohol screening or brief 
interventions. Current literature suggests that targeting 
specific patient populations (2), and delivering incentives 
as part of a multi-component approach (3) may be 
important for success.
The implications of these findings are discussed further in 
Section 5 below.
3. Remuneration system 
in Scotland: Case 
studies from three local 
health boards 
Aim and methods
This scoping exercise aimed to identify, and where 
possible source, relevant data from three local health 
boards in Scotland, and to assess the availability and utility 
of the data. 
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In consultation with the Project Advisory Group, we 
identified key contacts within six local health boards who 
were first approached in March 2016. An email request 
was sent explaining the purpose of the study and enquiring 
about the availability of data on ABI delivery and the 
Local Enhanced Service contract documentation for the 
health board. Those initially contacted were encouraged 
to put the research team in touch with a more relevant 
colleague where appropriate, and all such contacts were 
then followed up. All those contacted were encouraged to 
provide information covering the period since the inception 
of the national ABI target in 2008, and specifically in 
relation to any changes to the system or contracts over 
time. 
The main source of information was current and previous 
LES contracts for each of the health boards. The contracts 
were analysed to assess how each health board had 
specified expectations of general practitioners who signed 
up to the contract, and the funding models established. 
Some health boards also provided examples of the 
type of data they collect for monitoring purposes. When 
contacting the health boards requesting information on 
their data collection, it was emphasised that patient-level 
data collected by the health board should be described, but 
should not be shared with the research team, and no such 
data was collected. 
The implications arising from the case studies are 
discussed further in Section 5 below.
Findings
Based on the level of detail provided, three health boards 
(Lanarkshire, Lothian, and Tayside) were selected as case 
studies for reporting. Each case study below was shared 
with the main contact in the area to check for accuracy 
prior to publication.
Setting-specific data on ABI delivery within health boards 
showing reported delivery in primary care separated from 
other settings, is only publically available for the years 
2012/13 to 2014/15 (38–40), and is included in the case 
studies below. 
Case study 1: Lanarkshire
The estimated population of Lanarkshire health board 
area in mid-2014 is 653,310 (41). Over the three years, 
the number of ABIs reported in primary care varied from 
about 5,000 to 5,700 as shown in Figure 1 below (42). 
This represents a delivery rate of approximately 9 ABIs per 
1,000 population in 2014/15.
FIGURE 1
ABIs delivered in primary care in Lanarkshire since 2012/2013
Contractual Arrangements
A Local Enhanced Service contract for delivery of alcohol 
screening in primary care was in place in Lanarkshire from 
2008 to 2011. A copy of the contract was not provided 
but we were informed that during that time period general 
practitioners (GPs, primary care doctors) were paid a fee 
for each patient they screened only, with no fee in place for 
the delivery of a brief intervention where indicated following 
screening. This was felt to have resulted in a high level 
of reported screening but a low level of subsequent ABI 
delivery (though no figures were available) – known as a 
low ‘conversion rate’. 
From 2011 onwards, funding was no longer allocated 
to a Local Enhanced Service contract but instead used 
to establish a performance framework under which the 
funding was used to pay for additional community nursing 
capacity. This was intended to free up community nurses 
across the area to provide ABIs. 
Data Collection
Under this arrangement, all ABIs delivered were reported 
to a central data analyst using a standard form and 
entered into a database. The form includes patient-level 
data (such as community health index (CHI) number, date 
of birth, demographics etc.), the Fast Alcohol Screening 
Test (FAST) questions (43) and requires information on 
the practitioner who has delivered the intervention. An 
ABI would not count towards the allocated target unless 
delivered by a practitioner who was recorded as having 
received ABI training. The ABI training courses offered 
by Lanarkshire were based on the national ABI training 
materials (25) and were normally one day in duration. 
Conversion Rates
Data provided for the quarter from October to December 
2015 show the conversion rate of reported screenings to 
brief interventions in primary care (therefore community 
nursing under this scheme) was 41%, or 1 ABI delivered 
for every 2.45 screenings undertaken. The conversion 
rate in community mental health teams was 16%, and in 
antenatal settings the rate was 0.15% (2 ABIs delivered 
from 1,333 screenings). 
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Summary of Remuneration Model
•  Payment for additional nursing capacity only, no 
payment per individual screening or intervention 
delivered. 
•  Conversion rate: 1 ABI per 2.45 people screened using 
FAST.
•  ABIs only counted towards figures if delivered by 
a trained practitioner and were recorded using a 
standardized paper form.
Case Study 2: Lothian
Lothian is the second largest health board in Scotland, with 
a mid-2014 estimated population of 858,090 people (41). 
ABI delivery in primary care in Lothian fell between 2012 
and 2015 as shown in Figure 2 but is relatively high across 
the period at approximately 13.5 ABIs per 1000 population 
over 2014/15. Across the three years, overall ABI delivery 
exceeded the target set for Lothian by a considerable 
margin (134% of target in 2014/15). The decrease in ABIs 
delivered in primary care over this time coincided with a 
decrease across all three priority settings. 
FIGURE 2
ABIs delivered in Lothian since 2012/2013 in primary care
Contractual Arrangements
A Local Enhanced Service contract has been in place in 
Lothian since 2008/2009 and has been revised several 
times. The payment per ABI reported remained at £30 
throughout that period, with no more than one ABI per 
individual patient reimbursable per year. In the 2008/2009 
contract only, a payment of £20 was available for providing 
a follow-up consultation within 12 months of the delivery of 
the initial ABI but this was subsequently dropped. 
In the 2015/2016 contract the payment system changed 
from remunerating practices based on delivery reported 
retrospectively, to paying practices up front based on an 
allocated number of ABIs based on the number of patients 
in the practice (known as ‘list size’). In this system, money 
was reclaimed from GP practices who did not deliver their 
allocated interventions and redistributed to those who had 
reached their allocation. Available funds for payments 
under the LES contract for the year 2016/17 were reduced 
from £200K to £100K, due to cutbacks in Alcohol and 
Drug Partnership funding. It is unclear what impact this 
may have on delivery levels. The basic rate of £30 per 
intervention is still paid, but for a smaller allocated number 
of ABIs per practice.
Under the first LES contract in 2008/09, an engagement 
fee of £600 was included for infrastructure and also to 
support the requirement that within the first 12 months of 
the contract, at least one clinician from each contracted 
practice had to attend training. The national ABI two-day 
training course (25) delivered by NHS Lothian was the 
recommended course. A half-day practice-based course 
was also offered. The later contracts include information 
about available training and state that when an intervention 
is delivered it is assumed that the practitioner has “a basic 
professional level of health behaviour change expertise 
and communications skills (covered by the training 
programme)”. Unlike in Lanarkshire, no mechanism is 
in place to require that ABIs contributing to the reported 
figures are delivered only by trained practitioners. 
Data Collection
There were some variations in the LES contracts in Lothian 
over the years, but all included a requirement to submit 
regular reports on ABI delivery. Until 2012/13, ABI delivery 
data was gathered through dedicated care management 
and data collection screens provided by NHS Lothian on 
the Albasoft EScro software system. Demographic data 
on each individual patient is automatically included in 
the submitted reports for each reported ABI, as recorded 
on the EScro system, however the range/quality/
completeness of data included is unknown. 
Although the contract recommends that practices record 
screening results and consumption, without payment for 
screening, data about screening may not have been well-
completed and it is not therefore possible to calculate a 
reliable conversion rate for screenings versus ABI delivery. 
Screening & Brief Intervention Model
Rather than universal screening, the contracts mandate 
“opportunistic” screening of patients “with clinical at-risk 
presentations according to SIGN 74". In all versions of 
the contracts it was stated that a standard screening tool 
should be used, for example FAST, 5-SHOT, or CAGE 
(43–45). Minor changes were made over time to restrict 
eligibility to patients over 16 years of age and to refer to 
‘appropriate’ practice-employed staff as well as GPs. In the 
two latest contracts reviewed, information on access to an 
online training module for ABI was also included. 
A brief description is included in the contracts of what is 
expected in an Alcohol Brief Intervention. The intervention 
should be offered and delivered ‘within current or further 
consultation as deemed appropriate to those who screen 
positive’; of up to ten minutes duration; and requires skills 
and expertise in behaviour change in the practitioner. 
Although not required, each contract includes guidance 
on blood tests for biomarkers of alcohol abuse and their 
limitations. 
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Payment for Brief Intervention only, therefore conversion 
rate unreliable. Payment of £30 per intervention but up to a 
limited number of interventions per practice. 
The LES contract mandated training for practitioners and 
submission of regular delivery data which was collected 
on each individual patient receiving a BI on the electronic 
patient record (EScro).
Case Study 3: Tayside
With an estimated mid-2014 population of 413,800 people 
(41), Tayside delivered 3,929 ABIs in primary care in 
2014/2015, a rate of approximately 9.5 ABIs per 1,000 of 
population. Delivery fell in 2014/15 compared with earlier 
years (Figure 3). 
FIGURE 3
ABIs delivered in Tayside since 2012/2013 in primary care
Contractual Arrangements
A LES contract has been in place in Tayside since 
approximately 2008. Early on (though it is unclear from 
the contracts received how long this arrangement was in 
place), a fixed fee of £20 per intervention was paid, without 
separate fee for screening. From 1st July 2008, a payment 
of £2.20 was made for each patient screened and £9 per 
ABI delivered. From 1st April 2010 onwards, £10 was paid 
per BI delivered with £15 per ABI delivered paid over and 
above individual practice targets.
Two additional lump sums were included in the contracts: 
£250 per practice for ‘audit and concluding work’; 
and £500 as an “engagement and preparation fee” 
and to cover participation in training. Prior to service 
commencement, at least one named individual from 
each practice team was required to have “completed an 
approved NHS Tayside short training session on Brief 
Interventions and cascaded training to team members 
within the practice”. 
Data Collection
All participating practices were required to: 1) develop and 
maintain a register of patients with a positive FAST screen 
record; and 2) record all related information in a consistent 
manner using agreed Read codes for screening, Brief 
Intervention and consumption status. Read codes 
were specified in the contracts e.g. code “9k11 Alcohol 
consumption counselling” was used as a proxy for brief 
intervention. Practices made returns every six months. 
From April 2014, practices were also required to record 
reasons for not delivering ABIs to patients and specialist 
referrals made. The contract also states that “practices 
would have an opportunity to contribute towards more 
detailed audit of clinical outcomes at a regional level, to 
ensure maximum learning from the outcomes associated 
with this LES at a regional level”. Gender, postcode, FAST 
screening score, and date of birth data for each screening 
and ABI delivered were collected in an audit in 2014. 
The audit report included information on conversion rates 
for a six-month period in 2014, in which for Tayside as a 
whole, one ABI was delivered for every 12 screenings. 
This figure masks wide variation across the region, with a 
1:7 ratio in Dundee, 1:26 in Perth and Kinross, and 1:29 in 
Angus.
Screening & Brief Intervention Model
Practices were asked to screen patients opportunistically 
guided by SIGN74 but with an explicit focus on patient 
groups with occupational, social, psychiatric and physical 
conditions. From 1st April 2009, new patient registrations 
checks and pregnancy booking in appointments to LES 
were the focus for opportunistic screening. Practices were 
advised to use the FAST (43) and the associated Read 
code (388u). 
Participating practices were contracted to “deliver brief 
interventions and offer support to carry out behaviour 
change.” The contracts also advised that “Information 
provided to patients should include written and verbal 
information about safe levels and patterns of drinking. 
Wherever possible brief interventions (usually of between 
3-10 minutes duration) should be delivered within the 
consultation”. Practices were also advised to provide 
patients with information on support services and refer to 
specialist services ‘where appropriate’. 
Summary of Remuneration Model
•  £2.20 paid per FAST screen; £10 paid per ABI 
delivered. 
•  Average conversion rate: 1 ABI per 12 people screened 
using FAST.
•  The LES contract mandated training for practitioners, 
use of standard Read codes, reporting every six 
months, and participation in audit.
4. Interviews with 
local and national key 
informants
Aim and methods
The aim of the interview study was to explore the views 
of key local and national stakeholders on the design and 
impact of remuneration models in Scotland. 
Sample
Interviewees included local and national stakeholders 
identified via snowball sampling from the Project Advisory 
Group and through initial health board contacts. Four key 
people were interviewed from three different health boards, 
including one who also had national experience. A fifth 
interview was with an individual who had a national role 
in relation to the ABI target. One of the five interviewees 
was a GP. No-one declined to be interviewed, but one 
additional national informant with whom an interview had 
been arranged was not included due to sickness absence. 
Owing to the small potential sample of interviewees for 
this study, we do not provide any further details in order to 
protect the identity of the participants. 
Interview arrangements
Five interviews in total were conducted averaging 41 
minutes in duration (range 28 to 51 minutes) between 
May and June 2016 by Dr Niamh Fitzgerald. All interviews 
were conducted by telephone as we have found this to 
be preferred by participants in a similar previous study 
(46). Prior to the interview, each participant was sent an 
overview of the topic guide, a participant information sheet, 
and a consent form to keep for their records (Appendix 
B). At the time of the interview, verbal consent from 
participants was recorded as the consent form was read 
verbatim to the participant by the interviewer. All interviews 
were transcribed verbatim by a professional transcriber, 
and supplemented with notes from the interviews taken 
by Dr Niamh Fitzgerald. Where appropriate, some 
interviewees provided additional supporting documentation 
relating to the issues discussed. 
Analysis
Dr Lisa Schölin conducted thematic analysis on all 
interviews, mapping the themes arising onto a matrix 
to explore the different views across the local/national 
interviews. Dr Lisa Schölin used this to write the first 
draft of the findings. Dr Niamh Fitzgerald independently 
analysed all the interviews, and wrote the final draft of the 
findings in consultation with Dr Lisa Schölin.
Findings 
The interviews revealed a variety of views regarding 
the remuneration system for ABIs. Local key informants 
described both positive and negative aspects of the 
remuneration systems in Scottish primary care established 
under the national ABI programme, including the extent to 
which, and how, financial incentives impacted on screening 
and ABI delivery. Three overarching topics emerged as 
follows: 
i  benefits of financial incentives to support the 
implementation of screening and Brief Interventions in 
primary care
ii optimal models and levels of incentive, and
iii unintended or negative aspects of incentives.
Benefits of financial incentives
There was no overall consensus on whether financial 
incentives for GPs were worthwhile. Some argued that 
they had negative consequences (see below). Others felt 
that they were necessary, with one arguing that it was 
unlikely that GPs were already delivering ABIs, given the 
experience in some areas with high levels of incentive: 
“ I’ve also heard people say that we already do this, it’s 
kind of teaching your granny to suck eggs type thing 
which made it all the more remarkable that in some 
areas they had huge incentives on the table and it didn’t 
make a blind bit of difference. So if somebody’s already 
doing something and somebody’s offering you £50 to 
tick a box saying you’ve done it and people weren’t 
doing that, that leads me to think why?” [Interview 5]
Others reported a level of acceptance from the start of the 
ABI programme that delivery in primary care would need to 
be incentivized financially to ensure some consistency in 
performance and delivery of ABIs. 
“ If you ask nicely many GP practices in primary care 
will do additional stuff, but if you want to ensure that it 
happens in a consistent way across the piece it has to 
be part of the contract. It needs to be negotiated as part 
of the national contract or you need to negotiate that 
locally…so although some people find it difficult to get 
their heads around why the GPs get paid to do things 
separately, that’s just the way the NHS is set up and 
works.” [Interview 1]
“ I definitely think it would be on the back-burner [without 
incentives]” “It was obviously, it’s an extended contract, 
it’s not part of their work, they weren’t going to do it in 
any systematic way without being paid.” [Interview 4]
There was a risk, they felt, that delivery would fall away if 
financial incentives were withdrawn.
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“ [Our] experience would suggest that some practices 
would carry on doing it, probably because they hadn’t 
noticed they had stopped being paid, but in terms of 
being able to ‘keep the pot boiling’ so to speak, to 
use that kind of analogy, I think the pot would start to 
simmer, and then go cold.” [Interview 1]
Participants emphasized a further benefit of having 
incentives in place through a local contract, which was 
the ability to mandate participation in training and data 
collection to those professionals who were signed up to the 
contract. In Lanarkshire, where the funding was used to 
pay for community nursing, the conditions on that funding 
also mandated training and data collection. In two areas, 
at least one member of staff in each GP practice had to 
attend training in order to be eligible for payment under the 
Local Enhanced Service contract. This was thought to lead 
to greater alcohol awareness and confidence in discussing 
alcohol:
“[ Without the contract and associated training], what 
they wouldn’t be able to do is know what’s in a unit 
and that alcohol awareness…I think…that backed up 
their knowledge if you like. I think a lot of them would 
be, you know, keen to discuss alcohol, but maybe a 
bit more confident, a bit more aware after [training]…
it’s about getting them trained, a complete cohort of a 
service that are aware and that are following the same 
kind of guidelines. I think that’s where the payment 
comes in, it does give you a bit of an ability to know 
that these people have all been trained.” [Interview 
number withheld]
Under the LES contracts in some areas, GP practices 
were also required to participate in audit and provide data 
to the health board about delivery. It was not obvious how 
that would be possible without incentives. Furthermore, 
it was suggested that this benefit may only be possible 
with a local enhanced contract, and would not be easy to 
mandate if ABI delivery were included in a national GP 
contract. 
“ If you want your fee, you are being paid a fee to 
participate in audit. If you do not provide us with this 
data, you do not get your fee... We’re able to get the 
data because we’re paying for it.” [Interview number 
withheld]
“ [For other datasets in primary care] we can go and 
get that data, but it’s not so easy. We don’t have it in 
the kind of details that allows us to go ‘oh I wonder 
why that’s happening in that area or in that practice.” 
[Interview number withheld]
Optimal models and levels of incentive
Participants discussed the different models of 
remuneration in place in primary care, including whether 
to pay separately for individual components of ABI 
(screening, brief intervention and/or follow up). Amongst 
those who supported incentive payments, there was a 
consensus that it was better to have separate payments 
for screenings and brief interventions delivered, rather 
than paying only for ABI delivery as whole. 
“ I would have preferred, looking back, that we tied it 
up with the screening and, you know, even split the 
payment but that’s not the way we did it” [Participant]. 
“ And what difference do you think it would have made 
then if you’d split it?” [Interviewer] 
“ Well I think you’d be able to see how many screens 
went on to do an intervention and you’d be able to 
identify that. I mean there is information about screening 
but it’s not robust enough to mean anything very much.” 
[Participant] [Interview number withheld]
Referring to a payment model that paid only for ABIs not 
screening, one participant suggested:
“ It was perhaps inadvertently encouraging the delivery of 
brief interventions, whether that was the right outcome 
from the screening or the right thing to do other than a 
referral; that was the concern. That it was incentivising 
the delivery of something without actually the evidence 
of that’s why it’s being delivered, through a structured 
screening.” [Interview number withheld]
Another commented on the risk of only incentivising 
screening:
“ I think the other risk is that if you incentivise at the 
wrong stage then you might put unnecessary focus 
on that, so if you incentivise on screening rather than 
on the intervention then you end up screening a lot 
of people but not actually delivering a lot of ABIs.” 
[Interview number withheld]
Some participants referred to the issue raised above of 
the ‘conversion rate’ from screening to ABI delivery, that 
is, for every brief intervention, how many screenings were 
reported. There were diverging views on what the ‘right’ 
conversion rate should be. One participant suggested 
that a 1:3 or 1:4 ratio was indicative of GPs ‘perhaps 
subconsciously pre-selecting patients they might screen’ 
who are more likely to screen positive, whereas a 1:25 
was seen as indicating that the alcohol screening has 
been ‘included in a suite of screening that they’re doing’ or 
based on new patient registrations. Another commented:
“ Well, we pay now only for brief interventions, the 
[previous] contract … paid for screenings and that 
was stopped as I said and then it was changed to 
actual alcohol brief interventions. And having a much 
more targeted approach because the GPs screen[ed] 
everybody basically. And didn’t deliver very many ABIs.” 
[Interview number withheld]
It was not clear on what evidence the judgements were 
being made about conversion rates; however, participants 
reported that, in line with the national guidance, the 
local contracts were not intended to incentivize universal 
screening. As described in Section 3 above, most referred 
to the SIGN Guideline Annex 2 (23) that outlined a wide 
range of circumstances and conditions which may be 
linked to or affected by alcohol consumption. This was 
seen as more focused and better than universal screening, 
even though it was acknowledged as quite broad:
“ We came back again, just to restate the previous 
guidance we’d given about who should be screened 
and it is this fairly inclusive list of people who present 
with this range of problems and presentations, that it 
should not be part of blanket, it should not be a blanket 
screening programme.” [Interview 1]
“ I think one of the things in the contract said that it had to 
be linked to the SIGN 74 guidelines, you know, in other 
words that when they came through the door and had 
another issue and that was all on the [electronic patient 
record] screen, the links to the SIGN guidelines… but 
obviously that’s part of the training about the conditions 
you would expect to have or could be affected by an 
alcohol component…it was meant to be …targeted 
to people who it would seem there was an alcohol 
component to their presentation…” [Interview 4]
In addition to incentives, participants discussed the 
importance of other aspects of the implementation effort in 
securing delivery of ABIs. These included:
• providing practice-based training;
•  involving a GP champion in supporting practices and 
resolving difficulties;
•  ensuring practices have the materials and resources 
needed for ABI delivery;
•  the value of having a history of ABI work initiated prior to 
the national programme;
•  the importance of local funding from the national ABI 
programme;
•  setting delivery targets for each local area within a 
health board; and
• commitment from management and other staff. 
The last point above, was particularly highlighted by one 
participant as seemingly more important than the specific 
level of remuneration provided.  
“ One of them was offering like really huge money per 
ABI delivered and it didn’t seem to make any difference 
in that area, like the GPs just weren’t delivering it at 
that point and even this kind of fairly large amount of 
money was not enough to spark them into action. And 
then equally there were boards who were offering fairly 
minimal rewards for people doing it and they had good 
activity and good numbers…my interpretation at the 
time was it wasn’t the payment that was making the 
difference, it was the people on the ground who were 
driving the programmes. So if you had a really good 
local infrastructure set up and a really kind of strong 
backing by the senior management locally as well as the 
people on the ground and good local champions in all 
the right places they were the things that made people 
deliver, it wasn’t the money thing that made people 
deliver. It made very little difference to be honest.” 
[Interview number withheld]
Whilst reduced funding in Lothian was not perceived to have 
affected delivery, the figures showed that delivery of ABIs fell 
over the same time period as funding was reduced. 
Unintended or negative aspects of 
incentives
Two participants felt that incentives for GPs were not the 
best use of funding, both arguing that other staff within 
primary care, including nurses, were better placed to 
deliver alcohol screening and Brief Interventions. One 
of them, a GP, felt that GPs should focus their time on 
‘chronically ill patients’ – and on the “parts of the job that 
only [GPs] can do” [Interview 3]. This participant felt that 
GPs used their professional judgement to deliver ‘less 
formalised’ ABIs anyway as part of a normal consultation 
‘if we feel that somebody needs an intervention or advice 
or whatever” without incentives and that the incentive 
formalized (in their view unnecessarily) the way in which 
that intervention was delivered.
“ I think really what [an incentive] does is focuses people 
to address that specific issue and spend, probably 
well, because it was more formalized and there were 
like hoops to jump through then whoever was doing it 
had to follow that rather than go with their own clinical 
judgement….I don’t personally think that it adds 
anything to what I would normally do apart from take 
time away from something else I might have to focus on 
in that consultation.” [Interview 3]
They also felt that it was not the most appropriate way to 
fund GP services going forward. 
“ So it’s about providing the money there for the GPs to 
provide the needs of the community, and incentivising 
things, I don’t think, is something that we would really 
be interested in in the future because we want to get 
away from this piecemeal payment of a wee bit here and 
a wee bit there, because that’s not how practices can 
be financially stable if they’re relying on these bits and 
pieces” [Interview 3].
The other participant felt that it was sometimes nurses 
who delivered the interventions under the local enhanced 
service contract that was in place with GP practices 
anyway, and that the LES offered poorer value for money 
than investment of the funding into community nursing 
instead. They noted that once this was done, GPs no 
longer recorded ABI delivery in that health board and that it 
is unclear whether those GPs continued in the absence of 
an incentive. The participant then added that “GPs are very 
driven by incentives” [Interview number withheld]. 
The main risk of incentives noted by participants was 
that people might be “just kind of ticking a box to get the 
money”, but this was not felt to have been happening on 
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a large scale, and appeared to be more of a risk where 
payment was made for screening, and especially if only for 
screening. 
“ I think the main unintended consequence of the 
incentive is that people just kind of are ticking a box 
to get the money. People who, so that the programme 
looks as if it’s busier than it actually is because people 
just see it as a way to, yes, record activity that’s not 
actually happening or to deliver maybe substandard 
activity in that way because they know it’s not being 
reviewed, inspected, checked in that way. It doesn’t 
matter what they do, as long as they tick that box they 
were going to get the payment. So I think that’s a risk…
But largely you’ve got to trust the information that comes 
back but yes I think ABIs have happened during the 
course of the programme, I think there’s no doubt about 
that.” [Interview 5].
“ I think human nature being what it was…so somebody 
walking in to a GP’s surgery door, here’s Mrs. 
McGlumphy, she’ll still be drinking, we better screen her 
and deliver a BI and I’ll press the button and get paid 
for it. Rather than here’s Mrs. McGlumphy, that’s the 
third time this year she’s been in with vague abdominal 
pains, I’ll ask her about her drinking... It’s not acceptable 
for everybody over 65 coming in for their flu jab to be 
screened and for you to claim your [screening fee]… 
There is still the suspicion that there may be pressure 
from practice managers to make sure you do the 
screenings. And that’s understandable.” [Interview 1]
The extent to which the incentives were seen as valuable 
may have varied across GPs. One participant stated that 
“these sort of enhanced services are given to [GPs] for 
very little money and actually the [GP] practice usually 
ends up not making anything out of them anyway”. Three 
other participants noted that consistent delivery across GP 
practices was never achieved anyway. 
“ There remains inconsistencies in delivery, there are 
some practices that just don’t participate or don’t record 
or report. We don’t necessarily think that they’re not 
doing it but they’ve decided that the work involved in 
recording and reporting and participating in audit isn’t 
worth the money we’re offering. We think, we don’t 
know. And there is variation, that sometimes is not 
always clear as to why some practices, so [practices in 
one urban area] probably accounts for almost half our 
activity.” [Interview 1]
“ The money was clawed back [from those who had 
under-delivered] but it was then distributed to the 
practices who had over demonstrated their delivery…
And there’s a couple of wee one man bands who don’t 
do it at all, are not signed up to the [LES]”
“ …say there was 1,000 ABIs delivered in a health board 
over the course of a month… they weren’t equally 
spread among the health board or the GPs in that health 
board. It tended to be a small number of [GPs] propping 
up each board for the targets… So if one of those GPs 
went off sick or moved away or something then the risk 
was quite severe, that that health board wouldn’t make 
its target numbers… So across the country…there was 
never uniform buy-in by GPs for ABIs. There was by a 
significant minority is probably the best way to describe 
them but there wasn’t a majority of GPs delivering ABIs 
all over the place, not at all.”
One participant saw the lack of national co-ordination or 
evaluation of the local arrangements for ABI delivery in 
primary care as a missed opportunity, and described in 
detail how it could have been done differently to learn for 
the future.
“ a lot of these decisions on incentives were locally led. 
There was no kind of pre-defined incentivisation scheme 
from central government...there was a lot of national 
support materials that a lot of people were involved in 
but I don’t think there was anything specific in those 
support materials about incentivisation and mapping out 
different incentivisation models, that was largely absent 
from them.”
“ I think we all know Scotland missed a trick in terms of 
how they evaluated the national programme. There 
could have been national effectiveness evidence 
generated through that and a natural experiment of 
how that went ahead and what difference that made to 
people’s outcomes. But we weren’t able to do that.”
“ If I was starting again I would have…I would try and 
have either different models in different areas or a 
uniform model across the country and try and kind of 
compare and contrast and do it that way and then have 
a much more closer scrutiny of it over time to see how 
it’s worked and evaluate it rather than what happened, 
just leave everybody to their own devices and then try 
and scrap for information after that to see if it worked 
and not really fully understand what went on. I think this 
turned into probably being quite a key component of the 
programme that was never really fully understood and 
the fact that you can’t get information on it, like six years 
down the line, it’s pretty poor actually because there was 
such a lot going on in that area at the time. So that’s the 
way I would do it…pilot different approaches.”
“ It all seems really obvious now but yes. Even if it doesn’t 
work at least you’ve got the learning there and it means 
the next time you come round to doing something like 
this you go all right well we tried to incentivise for ABIs 
in 2010 and it didn’t work so we’re not going to do it that 
way, we’ll try and do it a different way.”
This participant summed up their views on incentives for 
ABI in primary care as follows:
“ To summarise I think we still don’t know if incentivisation 
is a good thing for ABIs in Primary Care because it was 
never, I don’t think it was ever studied properly from 
start to finish”.
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Discussion
Prior evidence on the impact of remuneration in relation to 
Alcohol Brief Interventions is scarce, particularly in relation 
to systems implemented in routine practice (1,2). Impact on 
either patient or provider outcomes of interest were mixed, 
however incentives may be an effective implementation 
strategy to encourage primary care providers to deliver 
alcohol interventions including screening. Incentives may 
have a particular impact when targeted at specific patient 
populations (2), or when delivered as part of a multi-
component approach (3). Data is limited on the optimum 
level of incentive to achieve positive effects, although 
in general, payment schemes that focus on outcomes 
rather than processes appear desirable (4,5). Routine 
data sources, such as electronic patient record codes 
(e.g. ‘GP Read Codes’), provide a potential means of 
assessing the impact of financial incentives on healthcare 
where primary care practices are required to collect such 
data to qualify for payment (47). There are recognised 
limitations of such routine data sources as proxy measures 
of delivery, particularly in terms of their sensitivity to capture 
the management and treatment of complex and chronic 
conditions such as alcohol use disorders (48,49). 
Local data reported here suggests that the opportunity to 
study robustly the use of remuneration systems in Scotland 
was largely missed, as health boards designed (and 
modified) their models without evaluating their effectiveness. 
Both models and rates of remuneration were changed over 
time, and could have been the subject of study as natural 
experiments. Interviews with local and national participants 
indicated that the decisions to change remuneration 
systems were based on a combination of local intelligence 
gathering and some shared learning nationally; but that 
assumptions about the likely impact of such changes on 
outcomes were not tested. 
There was a general consensus that paying separately for 
both screening and intervention delivery was better than 
paying only for one or the other. This enabled monitoring 
of the ‘conversion rate’ from screenings to interventions 
delivered. These rates varied across practitioners and 
areas e.g. 1:2.5 interventions to screenings delivered in 
Tayside, where delivery was largely by GPs versus 1:12 
in Lanarkshire led by community nurses. There were 
differing views on the optimal rate. No outcome evidence 
was available to enable any conclusion as to the optimal 
conversion rate to be drawn, and there was no process 
evaluation which could inform what drove the rates in 
practice. Amongst other possibilities, such differences may 
indicate differences in levels of alcohol problems amongst 
the population accessing the service, the willingness 
of the population to disclose such problems to different 
practitioners or the choice of patients being identified 
for screening. Each possible explanation raises further 
questions about implementation and effectiveness beyond 
the scope of this study, not least about the role of primary 
care in addressing alcohol dependence (50), and calls for 
careful reflection on the aims and target groups for ABI 
programmes. 
One identified recent study in Europe (including the UK) 
found that incentives (and training) increased the reported 
delivery of alcohol screening by primary care doctors (3). 
It cannot be assumed that such increases in recorded 
screening reflect a change in what happened with patients; 
it is possible that incentives improve recording and 
reporting of conversations that were happening anyway 
(51). Distortions such as misrepresentation or gaming 
are recognised risks (6). Whilst both possibilities were 
acknowledged by interviewees in this study, there was little 
sense that such distortions were widespread problems, 
and they were not viewed as fatal flaws in the programme. 
Incentives were also seen as having other potential 
benefits: facilitating monitoring of delivery in ways that 
could not otherwise have been achieved, and formalising 
or enhancing the quality and skill in conversations about 
alcohol that may have already been taking place (51). Other 
UK studies published since our review are supportive of 
incentives as an implementation strategy (52,53). 
The lack of understanding of what kind of enhanced skills 
or quality of brief intervention might actually improve patient 
outcomes has been a recognised gap in brief intervention 
research for years (15,54). Further study, including analysis 
of recordings of consultations (obtained with permission) 
could enable basic assessments of quality and contribute 
to a better understanding of the mechanisms through 
which such conversations may successfully change patient 
behaviour (18,54). Remuneration schemes could mandate 
such data collection, perhaps with additional incentives for a 
selection of ‘reference’ or ‘research leading’ GP practices.
Scotland’s ongoing programme of ABIs is rare, if not 
unique, in scale and scope globally; although Sweden and 
Finland have had national programmes that have been 
evaluated via cross-sectional questionnaires with primary 
care doctors (55–58). The level of public investment in the 
Scottish programme could be seen as having carried with 
it a responsibility to contribute to the wider ABI evidence 
base, and at the same time inform decisions about the 
future of the programme (including financial incentives) in 
Scotland. Current evidence cannot guide decisions even 
on the optimal level of incentives for delivery of ABIs as 
comparable pilots were not established from the start of 
the programme. The future of the programme is uncertain, 
as the new contract for GPs in Scotland places health 
promotion activity clearly within the remit of the wider 
primary care team, not with doctors, (59) and the Scottish 
Government awaits the findings of a review of targets for 
health and social care led by Sir Harry Burns (60). 
After falls between 2009 and 2013, alcohol sales 
in Scotland have increased recently, and levels of 
consumption remain high with an average of 10.7L of pure 
alcohol per adult sold in 2015 (equating to 20.8 units per 
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adult per week), 20% higher than in England/Wales (61). 
There were almost 35,000 alcohol-related hospitalizations 
in 2015–2016 (62). Whilst legislative measures addressing 
affordability, availability and marketing are likely to be more 
effective in preventing such harms, health professionals 
are treating people suffering from conditions that may be 
caused or aggravated by alcohol consumption every day. 
There is ample evidence to suggest that opportunities to 
help are missed (63–66), but much less to guide what form 
that help should take, and how best to incentivise or train 
practitioners to provide it (18,66–69). 
The failure to contribute to longstanding research questions 
about Alcohol Brief Intervention implementation, quality 
and outcomes in primary care is a serious and abiding 
weakness of the otherwise widely-admired Scottish national 
alcohol programme. As the Scottish Government ‘refreshes’ 
their national alcohol strategy, there is an opportunity to 
address this weakness by ensuring that robust and focused 
research is built into future programmes to inform alcohol 
policy in Scotland and globally.
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Appendix A – additional 
information on rapid 
literature review
Search strategy
We searched PubMed for peer-reviewed studies in the public 
domain, published in English, between 1st January 1990 and 
17th May 2016, reporting on the effect of payment systems in 
delivering ASBI in primary care using search terms relating to: 
a) alcohol; b) primary care; c) brief interventions; and d) pay 
for performance/financial incentives (see Table 1 for detailed 
search terms). The searches were conducted on 17th May 
2016. Based on a scoping exercise of the review topic in 
the Cochrane Library (2,29,70) types of studies eligible for 
inclusion included randomized control trials, non-randomized 
trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series 
studies, and longitudinal studies. 
The setting of interest in regards to intervention and 
participants was primary health care, which includes services 
that are ‘immediately accessible’ with patients presenting 
with different problems or conditions. These services are not 
reached through referral from another service. Any setting in 
Western Europe and English-speaking countries outside of 
Western Europe were considered for inclusion.
Titles and abstracts were assessed by Dr Lisa Schölin to 
exclude irrelevant papers. The full text of each remaining article 
was reviewed by Dr Amy O'Donnell to determine eligibility. An 
electronic data abstraction form was used to extract specific 
study characteristics.
Dr Lisa Schölin, Dr Amy O’Donnell & Dr Niamh Fitzgerald
SCOTTISH HEALTH ACTION ON ALCOHOL PROBLEMS  www.shaap.org.uk18
12 Queen Street, Edinburgh EH2 1JQ • Tel. 0131 247 3667 • Fax 0131 247 3664 • Email: shaap@rcpe.ac.uk
Results
We identified 235 titles, of which 10 underwent full text 
review. Of these, four studies met our inclusion criteria 
(1–3,30) and six studies were excluded (31–35) (see Figure 
1). The findings from the four eligible studies are described 
narratively below, with data summarized in Table 2.
All included studies were based in primary care settings 
and covered a range of countries (UK, USA, Australia, 
Catalonia, Poland, Netherlands and Sweden). Study design 
varied. One eligible paper reported on a cluster randomized 
controlled trial to test different strategies aimed at increasing 
rates of screening and brief intervention delivery in routine 
practice (3). Another paper summarized the findings of a 
retrospective longitudinal study drawing on routine primary 
care data to evaluate the impact of a targeted incentive 
scheme (QOF+) on alcohol screening rates amongst a 
specific patient population (2). One study drew on a range 
of existing routine cost and prevalence data sources to 
model the cost-effectiveness of four different strategies to 
increase delivery of screening and brief interventions in 
Australia (30). The final included paper used mixed methods 
(interviews and documentary analysis) to assess the level of 
state Medicaid payments in place to support the delivery of 
screening and brief alcohol interventions in the USA (1).
Specific objectives were twofold:
1  To identify what payment systems have been introduced 
to support the delivery of screening and/or brief 
interventions for alcohol in primary care? 
2  To assess what the evidence can tell us about the likely 
impact of these payment systems on ASBI delivery rates?
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TABLE 1
PubMed search terms
Concept Search Term
Drinking 
alcohol terms
Alcohol*[tiab] OR “Alcohol drinking”[mesh] OR “Alcohol induced disorders”[mesh] OR “Alcohol related 
disorders”[mesh] OR “Alcoholic intoxication”[mesh] OR Alcoholism[mesh] OR “Binge drinking”[mesh] OR 
Drinking[tiab] OR Ethanol[mesh]
Screening 
/ brief 
interventions 
terms
((behavior*[tiab] OR behaviour*[tiab] OR brief[tiab] OR early[tiab] OR lifestyle[tiab] OR minimal[tiab] OR 
opportunistic[tiab] OR structured[tiab]) AND (advice[tiab] OR consultation[tiab] OR counseling[tiab] OR 
counselling[tiab] OR intervention*[tiab] OR screening[tiab] OR treatment[tiab])) OR “Harm Reduction”[Mesh] 
OR “harm reduction”[tiab] OR “Motivational Interviewing”[mesh] OR ((motivational[tiab] OR counseling[tiab] OR 
counselling[tiab]) AND (interview[tiab] OR intervention[tiab]))
Primary care 
terms
“Attitude of Health Personnel”[mesh] OR “community care”[tiab] OR “Community Health Services”[mesh] OR 
doctor[tiab] OR doctors[tiab] OR “family medicine”[tiab] OR “Family Practice”[mesh] OR “family practice”[tiab] OR 
“general practice”[tiab] OR “general practices”[tiab] OR “general practitioner”[tiab] OR “general practitioners”[tiab] 
OR “Patient Care Management”[Mesh] OR “Patient Care”[Mesh] OR Physician*[tiab] OR “Physician Incentive 
Plans”[mesh] OR “Physicians, Primary Care”[mesh] OR “Primary Care Nursing”[Mesh] OR “Primary Care”[tiab] OR 
“Primary Health Care”[mesh] OR “Primary Health Care”[tiab] OR “Primary Healthcare”[tiab]
Payment / 
remuneration 
terms
bonus*[tiab] OR “co-pay”[tiab] OR compensat*[tiab] OR contribution[tiab] OR “Employee Incentive Plans”[Mesh] OR 
“fee for”[tiab] OR “fee per”[tiab] OR fees[tiab] OR incentiv*[tiab] OR monet*[tiab] OR monetary[tiab] OR “P4P”[tiab] 
OR pay*[tiab] OR “performance based”[tiab] OR “Physician Incentive Plans”[mesh] OR “pre-pay”[tiab] OR 
profit*[tiab] OR “Prospective payment system”[mesh] OR “Reimbursement, Incentive”[mesh] OR reimburse*[tiab] 
OR remunerat*[tiab] OR “results based”[tiab] OR reward*[tiab]
FIGURE 1
Flowchart for Review
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TABLE 2
Summary of findings
Author(s), year Aim, methods Setting (country), No. 
participants 
Incentive scheme, 
Payment level
Key findings
Shanahan et al, 
2006 (30)
Aim: To assess the relative 
cost effectiveness of four 
strategies (academic detailing, 
computerised reminder 
systems, target payments and 
interactive continuing medical 
education) to increase the 
provision of screening and 
brief interventions
Methods: Cost-effectiveness 
study using economic 
modelling approach. Key 
outcomes of interest: change 
in annual alcohol consumption 
in grams and ICER (cost per 
standard drink avoided)
Primary care (Australia), N/A 
(modelling based on full GP 
population n = 21, 671 GPs)
Practice Incentive 
Programme (PIP) = one-off 
and / or annual payment paid 
to the practice for registering 
with a programme. Payment 
level is based on no. 
eligible patients enrolled 
in the practice. Study used 
AUS$0.251 per enrolled 
patient for modelling 
purposes.
Service Incentive Payments 
(SIP) = are paid for the 
provision of a specific 
service. Study used AUS$101 
per screen for modelling 
purposes (AUS$5 and 
AUS$15 for sensitivity 
analyses).
Targeted payments were 
the least efficient strategy to 
increase GPs provision of SBI, 
resulting in reduction of 45,618 
grams alcohol per week with 
ICER of AUS$691. 
This compared to computerised 
reminder system and academic 
detailing which resulted in 
reductions of 85,370 and 
79,371 grams/alcohol, with 
an ICER of AUS$91 and $50 
respectively.
Limitations: modelling based on 
available cost and prevalence 
data; impact of single strategies 
only.
Fussell et al, 2011 
(1)
Aim: To assess state 
Medicaid activity to implement 
Healthcare Common 
Procedure Code System 
Codes and pay for screening 
and brief intervention.
Healthcare settings (USA), 
37 interviews; 7 email 
correspondents.
Medicaid reimbursement for 
delivery of screening and 
brief interventions for alcohol. 
State level payments ranged 
from $20 in Iowa to $116.60 
in Alaska.
No relevant findings – focus 
was on the coding for 
reimbursement as opposed 
to any impact on patient or 
provider outcomes.
Methods: Telephone interviews 
and email correspondence 
with Medicaid representatives 
plus web-based searches of 
Medicaid fee schedules.
Hamilton et al, 
2013 (2)
Aim: To assess the impact of 
a local pay-for-performance 
programme on delivery of 
ASBI in UK primary care.
Methods: Longitudinal study 
using data from 2008 to 2011 
with logistic regression to 
examine disparities in ASBI 
delivery.
Primary care (London, 
UK), 30 general practices 
covering 211, 834 registered 
patients of which 45,040 
were targeted by the 
incentive scheme. 
QOF+ incentivized 
participating practices 
to screen patients with 
cardiovascular conditions, 
mental health conditions 
and patients on the 
cardiovascular risk register.
Practices were paid up to 
£5,607 for screening and 
delivering an intervention to 
all eligible patients.
QOF+ increased recorded 
screening rates in both eligible 
and non-eligible patients. No. 
of eligible patients with record 
of screening increased from 
4.8% to 65.7%; non-eligible 
from 0.32% to 14.7%. (Both 
groups adjusted odds ratio 
(AOR) = 72.0, 95% CI 12.1-
427.7, p<0.001; eligible patients 
only AOD 7.54, CI 5.67-10.01, 
p<0.001). 
Limitations: study design limits 
extent to which effects can be 
attributed to incentives alone.
Anderson et al, 
2016 (3)
Aim: To test if training and 
support (TS), financial 
reimbursement (FR), and 
option of referring screen-
positive patients to an internet-
based method of giving advice 
(eBI) can increase primary 
health care providers’ delivery 
of AUDIT-C based screening 
and advice to heavy drinkers.
Design Cluster randomized 
factorial trial with 12-
week implementation and 
measurement period. Primary 
outcome was proportion of 
eligible patients 18+ screened 
in 12 week period.
Primary care (Catalonia, 
England, Netherlands, 
Poland & Sweden), 120 
general practices (24 per 
country)
Practices were paid for 
screening and advice 
activities during the 12-week 
implementation period. 
Incentive rates varied by 
country: Catalonia = max 
ceiling rate of €250 with 
fees calculated on average 
individual performance; 
England = max ceiling 
rate of €2200, with €6 per 
screening & €25 per advice; 
Netherlands = max ceiling 
rate €1250, with €9 per 
screening & €13.50 per 
advice; Sweden = max 
ceiling rate of €3300 with 
€2 per screening & €15 per 
advice.
Combination of TS + FR was 
most effective in increasing rate 
of screening patients for alcohol 
consumption. Ratio of logged 
proportion screened during 12 
week period was: 1.48 (95% 
CI 1.13-1.95) for TS v no-TS; 
2.00 (95% CI 1.56-2.56) for FR 
v no-FR; with e-BI not leading 
to any increase. TS + FR was 
2.34 (95% CI 1.77-3.10); TS 
+ FR + eBI was 1.68 (95% CI 
1.11-2.53).
Limitations: relied on volunteer 
practices which may not be 
representative; measured 
provider behavior outcomes 
rather than patient outcomes; 
relatively short time period 
of intervention; only covered 
patients 18+. 
1 2004 values  
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Appendix B
Remuneration for Alcohol Brief Interventions  
in Primary Care: A Scoping Study
Dr Niamh Fitzgerald (University of Stirling), Dr Lisa Schölin (University of Stirling),  
Dr Amy O’Donnell (Newcastle University)
You are being invited to take part in a study of remuneration for brief interventions in 
primary care. Before you decide if you want to take part in the study it is important that you 
understand what the study is about. Please read the following information, and if you have 
any questions do not hesitate to contact the Principal Investigator (PI). 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The aim of this scoping study is to assess the availability and usefulness of data relating to remuneration and 
delivery rates for alcohol brief interventions in Scotland, in order to facilitate a rapid review of such data, and 
to inform future remuneration systems and further research on the use of payments to incentivise alcohol brief 
intervention delivery. 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
You have been invited to take part due to your experience and/or knowledge of primary care contracts and/or 
available data and financial incentives on alcohol brief interventions in Scotland.
Do I have to take part? 
You decide if you want to take part in the study. If you choose to take part you will be asked to confirm that you 
give the researcher the right to use what you say for the purpose of this study.
What if I change my mind about taking part? 
You can choose to withdraw from the study at any time without giving any reason for doing so. 
What will taking part in this study involve? 
If you choose to take part in the study, you will be interviewed by Niamh Fitzgerald or Lisa Schölin about your 
views on remuneration systems for alcohol screening and alcohol brief interventions. The interview will take 
approximately one hour and will be audio recorded with your permission. 
What happens next? 
If you decide to take part in the study, an interview will be scheduled on a time convenient for you. The 
interview can be conducted either in person or over telephone. 
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Will I benefit from taking part? 
There are no direct benefits for you from taking part in this study, however the results will help inform further 
research in this area which can improve the delivery of alcohol brief interventions in primary care.
Are there any risks involved in taking part? 
There are no anticipated risks with taking part in this study.
Will I be paid to take part? 
No financial incentive will be provided for taking part in this study.
Will I be able to be identified from the results? 
All data will be treated confidentially and the information you provide will be anonymised so that you cannot be 
identified. 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The findings from this study will provide insights into the data available on remuneration systems on alcohol 
screening and brief intervention. The results will be written up as a report to the funder and/or for peer 
reviewed publication or conference presentation. As this is a scoping study, the results will inform future 
discussions around payment for ABIs and future research.
Who is organising and funding the research? Who has approved the research? 
This research has been approved by the School of Health Sciences Research Ethics Committee (SREC) at 
University of Stirling (SREC 15/16 - Paper No.49 - Version 1). The project is funded by the Scottish Health 
Action on Alcohol Problems (SHAAP). 
For further information please contact one of the researchers below. 
Dr Niamh Fitzgerald (PI) 
University of Stirling
niamh.fitzgerald@stir.ac.uk
+44 (0)1786 467 362
Dr Lisa Schölin 
University of Stirling
lisa.scholin@stir.ac.uk
+44 (0)1786 467 382
Dr Amy O’Donnell
 Newcastle University
amy.odonnell@newcastle.ac.uk
 +44 191 208 5696
Dr Lisa Schölin, Dr Amy O’Donnell & Dr Niamh Fitzgerald
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- Consent form -
Dr Niamh Fitzgerald (University of Stirling), Dr Lisa Schölin (University of Stirling),  
Dr Amy O’Donnell (Newcastle University)
To be read out to participants for verbal consent
I have been provided information about the study and been given appropriate time 
to consider the information, ask questions, and have had any queries satisfactorily 
answered
I understand that I taking part in this study is voluntary and that I can choose to 
withdraw from the research at any time without having to give a reason for doing so 
and this will not affect my legal rights
I understand that any information I provide will be treated confidentially and 
anonymised 
I agree to this interview being audio recorded
I understand that anonymised verbatim quotes may be used in publications resulting 
from this study
I agree to take part in the study
Date Signature of researcher taking consent:
Financial Incentives for Alcohol Brief Interventions in Primary Care in Scotland 
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Topic Guide for Interviews
1  Please describe your current role and any previous role/responsibility/involvement in relation to 
financial incentives for alcohol brief interventions in primary care?
 Prompts:
 a  E.g. can you remember when you first started to work on this agenda? What was your role? How did it 
come about? 
2  Going back to the initiation of alcohol brief interventions in your health board area/in Scotland, can 
you describe the establishment of related financial incentives? 
 Prompts:
 a What options were considered? 
 b Who was involved in the discussions? 
 c What incentive system was set up at that time? 
 d How were any incentives contractually established?
 e What was the rationale for the decisions made? 
 f What were your impressions of how the ABI initiative was perceived by others? 
3 What data collection was established regarding ABIs?
 Prompts:
 a What data was collected – data items, frequency of returns etc.? What was contractually required/not? 
 b How was the data collected?
 c Who collected the data?
 d What support was provided to enable data collection? (training, printed guidance, computer templates)
 e  What is your view on the quality of the data collected? Have any steps been taken to monitor/evaluate 
data quality?
 f  What data is currently available? Who owns the data? What could be shared with researchers (under 
appropriate safeguards) for future analysis?
4 Did the financial incentives change over time? If so, how/why?
 Prompts:
 a What led to the changes? 
 b What incentive system was then established? 
 c What was the rationale for the decisions made? 
 d Were there any associated changes to the data collection? If so, repeat prompts for question 3.
5 What do you think of financial incentives for alcohol brief interventions and their impact?
 Prompts:
 a Do they have their intended impact? In what circumstances?
 b What is the best level and structure for such incentives? 
 c What, if any, are the unintended consequences of financial incentives? In what circumstances? 
6  From all that you’ve mentioned, what would you pick out as the key lessons for others considering 
financial incentives for alcohol brief interventions in primary care settings? 
7. Can we have a copy of any contracts, templates, and guidance materials provided?
Dr Lisa Schölin, Dr Amy O’Donnell & Dr Niamh Fitzgerald
SHAAP - Scottish Health Action on Alcohol Problems
12 Queen Street
Edinburgh EH2 1JQ
Tel:  +44 (0) 131 247 3667
Email: shaap@rcpe.ac.uk
www.shaap.org.uk
